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Resolving the Ambiguity: How
Cowen v. Ga. Sec’y of State Helps
Third Parties Climb Georgia’s
Steep Mountain of Ballot-Access
Restrictions *
I. INTRODUCTION
Minor political parties are rejoicing and celebrating a significant
victory1 in Cowen v. Ga. Sec’y of State,2 as a stepping stone in loosening
Georgia’s rigorous ballot-access restrictions.3 Georgia’s rigorous 5%
petition requirement is one of the highest barriers in the nation for a
political body to overcome, a barrier that has never been breached in
Georgia since its adoption in 1943.4 In Cowen, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia erred by granting summary
judgment in favor of Georgia’s Secretary of State without applying the
test established in Anderson v. Celebrezze5 to determine Cowen’s

* I would like to thank Dean Cathy Cox and Professor Daisy Floyd for their assistance,
advice, and suggestions in helping me write this Casenote. I also would like to thank
Cathleen Wharton for her amazing edits.
1 Jessica Szilagyi, Libertarian Party of Ga Claims Victory After Ruling in Ballot Access
(June
4,
2020),
Case
Against
Sec.
of
State,
ALLONGEORGIA
https://allongeorgia.com/georgia-state-politics/libertarian-party-of-ga-claims-victory-afterruling-in-ballot-access-case-against-sec-of-state.
2 960 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2020).
3 Szilagyi, supra note 1.
4 Jim Galloway, Greg Bluestein, Tia Mitchell, The Jolt: Third-party candidates say
state law requiring thousands of signatures puts their lives at risk, AJC (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/the-jolt-third-party-candidates-say-state-law-requiringthousands-signatures-puts-their-lives-risk/BstBmD77tJu2fuedXXzSzI/; see also O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-170(b).
5 460 U.S. 780 (1983).

939

940

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

associational rights violation claim under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The case was remanded to the district court for the court to apply the
Anderson test in determining whether Georgia’s five percent signature
ballot-access restriction violated Cowen’s associational rights.6 The
Anderson test is a multi-step process for evaluating the
constitutionality of ballot-access requirements under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.7 The ruling in Cowen has implications for the
future of Georgia’s rigorous ballot-access requirements and may lead to
the emergence of third-parties within the context of the entrenched
two-party system in the state.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Cowen case arose from challenges by the Libertarian Party of
Georgia to Georgia’s ballot-access laws for congressional candidates;
interested voters and several prospective Libertarian candidates for
Congress collectively brought suit alleging the Georgia’s ballot-access
requirements were unconstitutional. In this suit, the Libertarian Party
(“Party”)
alleged
Georgia’s
ballot-access
restrictions
were
unconstitutional as a violation of the Party’s associational rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments as well as a violation of the
Party’s Equal Protection rights8 under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Party contended that Georgia’s ballot-access requirements are so
rigorous as to preclude the viability of a third-party candidate and are
therefore unconstitutional.9
In its motion for summary judgment, the Party introduced evidence
that demonstrated a requisite of 321,714 valid signatures of registered
voters were necessary for a third-party to run a full slate of candidates
to get on Georgia’s ballot in a federal election. Additionally, the Party
provided evidence that a third-party candidate had never successfully
petitioned themself onto the ballot despite the attempts of at least
twenty candidates since 2002. Furthermore, the Party provided
evidence highlighting the pragmatic difficulties of gathering signatures:
“the alleged[] error-prone signature-checking process,” its inability to
access voters, voters’ concerns of disclosing confidential information on
Cowen, 960 F.3d at 1340.
Id. at 1342.
8 It is noted that Equal Protection Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is
discussed in Cowen, but this Casenote will only address the associational rights claim and
the application of the Anderson test.
9 Id. at 1340–41.
6
7
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the nominating petition, and the substantial cost of petitioning. The
latter is particularly burdensome since federal campaign finance laws
prohibit candidates from receiving funds from the national party to help
alleviate the costs.10
Despite noting “a robust record,” and that “the Party raised ‘some
compelling arguments,’” the district court held it was unnecessary to
utilize the Anderson test to address constitutional challenges to
Georgia’s ballot-access restrictions.11 It concluded that Jenness v.
Fortson12 had decided the issue and created a per se preclusion to any
future challenges of Georgia’s ballot-access restrictions. The district
court also declined to address the Party’s Equal Protection challenge.13
The appellate court reversed the northern district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Georgia’s Secretary of State.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Georgia’s Election Statutes
In Georgia, a political party is a political organization that has
acquired at least twenty percent of the total votes in the last
gubernatorial election14 or at least twenty percent of the electors polled
from the total votes of the last presidential election.15 Political
organizations unable to meet this threshold are known as a “political
body” under Georgia law.16 Candidates of a political body are
guaranteed ballot-access if they are able to submit a nomination
petition signed by the number of registered voters proportionate to the
population of voters eligible to vote in the previous election upon the
office that a third-party is seeking.17 Additionally, it is necessary for the
candidate to submit a petition certified by a sworn chairperson and
secretary of a political body that is registered with Georgia’s Secretary

Id at 1341.
Id.
12 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
13 Cowen, 960 F.3d at 1341.
14 Gubernatorial is defined as “relating to a governor (the official leader of a state in
the
[United
States
of
America].”
CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/gubernatorial (last visited Nov. 12,
2020).
15 O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(25)(A)–(B).
16 O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(23).‘“A political body’ or ‘body’ means any political organization
other than a political party.” Id.
17 O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170(b).
10
11
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of State, certifying that the nominee of a political body was nominated
by virtue of a convention.18
In 1922, Georgia’s legislature enacted its first formal ballot-access
restrictions. They required candidates of a minor party for national and
statewide offices to file notice of their candidacy by “giving their names
and the offices for which they are candidates, with the Secretary of
State,” but did not require any petition or fee.19 In 1943, the legislature
amended its ballot-access laws by imposing heightened third-party
requirements, allowing access: “(1) if the political party received 5
percent of the votes in the last general election for the office in question,
which guaranteed ballot access; or (2) by gathering petitions signed by 5
percent of all the registered voters in the state or district.”20 In 1986,
the legislature substantially reduced the signature and vote
requirements for third-party candidates seeking statewide positions,
but kept the five percent requisite for federal and non-statewide
elections.21
Thus, a candidate of a political body seeking a statewide position is
only required to obtain one percent of the total registered voters eligible
to vote in the last election; whereas candidates seeking federal or nonstatewide positions are still required to obtain five percent of the total
registered voters statewide or within their districts.22 Finally, a
candidate of a political body seeking the office of the presidency of the
United States must prove the political body either received one percent
of the total number of registered voters in the preceding election, or
submit a petition signed by at least 7,500 registered voters.23
B. The Establishment of the Anderson Test under the First and
Fourteenth Amendment
Cowen breathed new life into the Anderson test for political bodies
challenging Georgia’s electoral ballot-access restrictions. This test has
an interesting history. Prior to Anderson, the Supreme Court of the
United States and lower courts determined a claim for an associational

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170(g).
Cowen, 960 F.3d at 1340 (citing 1922 Ga. Laws 100).
20 Id. (citing 1943 Ga. Laws 292).
21 Id. at 1340-41 (citing 1986 Ga. Laws 292).
22 O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170(b).
18
19

23 National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECRETARIES OF STATE, 1, 8–9. https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/202007/research-ballot-access-president-Jan20_0.pdf (last updated January 2020).
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rights violation by evaluating whether the severity of the restrictions
imposed by state law infringed on a minor political organization’s
associational rights, but there was no specific approach defined for this
analysis.24
For example, in the 1968 decision of Williams v. Rhodes,25 a thirdparty candidate successfully challenged Ohio’s ballot-access restrictions
that required a third party to submit petitions containing signatures
from a number of qualified voters that equaled fifteen percent of the
number of persons who voted in the preceding gubernatorial election.
The United States Supreme Court struck down the statute as a
violation of the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause.26 The
Court held that freedom of association was protected by the First
Amendment and that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented the states
from infringing on this right.27 For the first time, the Court held that
state laws preventing ballot-access by minor political parties were
unconstitutional.28
Additionally, the Court held that the right of individuals to advance
political beliefs regardless of their political persuasion and the right of
individuals to cast their votes effectively rank among the “most precious
freedoms.”29 Any other freedoms were worthless if the right to vote was
undermined by the implementation of rigorous ballot-access
restrictions.30 However, the Court did not provide guidance for future
courts to use in evaluating a third party’s associational rights claim.
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s five
percent signature requirement in Jenness, concluding that Georgia’s
electoral requirements did not “freeze[] the status quo,” of a duopolistic
two-party system and did not abridge the rights of free speech and
association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.31 The
Court did not provide guidance in evaluating the validity of future
claims of associational rights violations by minor political
organizations.32

See infra pp.8–11.
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
26 Id. at 24–25, 31, 34.
27 Id. at 30–31.
28 Id. at 38–39.
29 Id. at 30.
30 Id. at 31.
31 403 U.S. at 439–40.
32 Id. at 440–41.
24
25
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Instead, the Court in Jenness distinguished the purpose of Georgia’s
electoral requirements from that in Williams, holding that the purpose
of Ohio’s law was the creation of a two-party duopoly, exclusively
comprised of Republicans and Democrats.33 Justice Stewart
distinguished the two statutes by noting that Georgia’s statutes
recognized write-in votes, provided a reasonable deadline, recognized
independent candidates, and did not require signees of the petitions to
affirm whether they intended to vote for that candidate.34 However,
once again, the Court did not provide any guidance for the lower courts
to utilize in evaluating associational rights violation claims.
A decade later, in Anderson, the United States Supreme Court
provided a three-pronged balancing test for lower courts to use in
evaluating minor parties’ challenges to the constitutionality of ballotaccess requirements.35 In a 5-4 decision, the Court struck down an Ohio
ballot-access deadline because of the inflexibility and inconsistency of
the statute requiring minor parties to register their candidacy by
March, when the major parties were merely beginning the primary
nomination stage of the presidential election. Furthermore, the Court
held that this early deadline impeded third-party candidates’ efforts to
gather signatures, recruit volunteers, engage in media publicity, and
receive campaign contributions.36 As it did in both Williams and
Jenness, the Court in Anderson held that it was unconstitutional for a
state to impose requirements that are impossible for a third-party to
meet, but the state’s law would be held constitutional if a state’s
interest was considered reasonable depending on the state’s
justification.37
In Anderson, the Court required the lower court to determine the
constitutionality of a state’s ballot access laws by first considering “the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”38 Second, the court must
“identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as
justification for the burden imposed by its rule.”39 In the evaluation of
the justification of a State’s interest, the court must consider the
validity and strength of those injuries as well as the State’s interests

Id. at 434–35.
Id. at 438–39.
35 460 U.S. at 789.
36 Id. at 781, 790–792.
37 Id. at 787–788, 801, 805–06.
38 Id. at 789.
39 Id.
33
34
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that necessitate burdening a third-party’s rights.40 Third, a court may
only determine whether a challenged provision was unconstitutional
after weighing all these factors.41
C. The Eleventh Circuit handling of Ballot-Access Restriction Claims
after Anderson
Even though Anderson was decided in 1982 and Jenness in 1971, in
challenges following Anderson, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Jenness to
uphold the constitutionality of Georgia’s ballot-access restrictions. This
reliance on Jenness created an ambiguity on the controlling authority in
the Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence, treating cases from Georgia
differently than those from other states.42
1.
The Eleventh Circuit’s evaluation of Associational Rights
violation claims in Georgia
In 2002, the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Cartwright v. Barnes,43 upheld Georgia’s five percent signature
requirement for a third-party candidate seeking a non-statewide office
without mentioning the Anderson test.44 There, the Libertarian Party
argued that the re-drawing of new congressional districts and Georgia’s
recently revised statute requiring third-parties to have their petitions
notarized had together altered Georgia’s political landscape, and made
it substantially distinguishable from the facts in Jenness. The court
rejected this argument, holding the ballot-access restrictions were
constitutional. Relying on Jenness, the court concluded that the new
notary requirement only required a petitioner submit a notarized
affidavit that each signer signed their own names and that the
redistricting of congressional districts failed to impose any suffocating
restrictions or a significant burden on the circulation of petitions for
political bodies.45 The court did not mention the Anderson test.
Similarly, in 2010, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that
Georgia’s five percent requirement was too burdensome even though no
independent candidate had ever overcome this threshold.46 In Coffield
v. Handel, the court upheld the ballot-access restriction, citing the lack
Id.
Id.
42 See infra section C.
43 304 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2002).
44 Id. at 1139.
45 Id. at 1140–41.
46 Coffield v. Handel, 599 F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 2010).
40
41
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of changes to Georgia’s electoral laws from Jenness and Cartwright.47
Even though Anderson predated Cartwright and Coffield by more than
two decades, the court never mentioned the Anderson test in evaluating
the validity of the ballot-access provisions.48 This omission created an
ambiguity in Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence as to whether challenges
to Georgia’s ballot-access restrictions were precluded by Jenness or
should be determined by a standard that merely does not “freeze the
political status quo,” of the two-party political system derived from
Jenness that previously upheld the restriction.
This ambiguity is further complicated by the distinctive nature of
presidential elections. In 1984, the Eleventh Circuit extended the
Anderson test in Bergland v. Harris.49 There, the district court
dismissed the political bodies’ complaint that challenged the distinction
between ‘“a political party’ and a ‘political body,’” the signature
requirements, and the filing deadline, without applying the Anderson
test.50 Concluding that the record was inadequate, it remanded the case
to the district court to establish a record to decide the associational
rights violation claim.51 The court held that prior cases upholding the
constitutionality of Georgia’s ballot-access restrictions were not a
foreclosure from future challenges and that a court must evaluate the
evidence using the Anderson test.52 However, the court emphasized the
distinction between a presidential candidate and one for a state office,
concluding the state had a lesser interest in the former because the
outcome “will be largely determined by voters beyond the State’s
boundaries.”53 Over time in the Eleventh Circuit, the holding of this
case came to be limited to restrictions concerning presidential
candidates.54

Id.
In 2002, the existence of the Anderson test had been the controlling authority for
over twenty years, and by 2010, it had been the controlling authority for twenty-eight
years. See Cartwright, 304 F.3d at 1138; See Coffield, 599 F.3d at 1276.
49 767 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1985).
50 Id. at 1552–53.
51 Id. at 1552.
52 Id. at 1554; See Jenness, 403 U.S. at 431; See also McCrary v. Poythress, 638 F.2d
1308 (5th Cir. 1981).
53 Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795).
54 Due to the omission of the Anderson test in Cartwright and Coffield, the emphasis
upon the uniqueness of presidential elections created an ambiguity over time where the
district court in Georgia believed the Anderson test only applied to presidential ballotaccess challenges. See District Court Order at *12-13, Cowen v. Raffensperger, No. 1:17CV-04660-LMM (N.D.Ga. Sept. 23, 2019).
47
48
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2.
The Application of the Anderson test outside of Georgia
In addressing ballot-access restrictions in states other than Georgia,
there was not any ambiguity regarding the controlling authority, as the
Eleventh Circuit consistently applied the Anderson test to evaluate
associational rights violation claims. For example, in New Alliance
Party v. Hand,55 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit overturned an Alabama statute that imposed an April 6th
deadline on candidates seeking a statewide position to submit their
signature petitions.56 The court found the statute was unconstitutional
under the Anderson test57 because it burdened the plaintiff’s efforts to
access the Alabama ballot,58 and Alabama failed to justify its interest in
requiring an earlier deadline when the previous deadline was in July.59
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
Anderson test in Green v. Mortham,60 to determine that Florida’s
election statute requiring a “qualifying fee equal to seven and a half
percent of the annual salary for the office [Green] sought,”or filing a
petition with signatures of three percent from the registered party in
that district, was not an associational rights violation.61 After the court
applied the Anderson test, the court upheld Florida’s ballot-access
restrictions because filing fees were always considered reasonable and
non-discriminatory.62 Additionally, the court upheld Florida’s 3%
petition signature requirements because it was not burdensome for
Green to collect the necessary signatures if he had collected fifty-two
signatures every day.63
933 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1570.
57 Id. at 1574.
58 Id. at 1576.
59 Id. Additionally, the court noted that the new deadline in April was when most
candidates for the major parties are announcing their candidacy, which undermines the
interest of the state in justifying an earlier deadline for minor political organizations. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that “[n]o one can seriously contend that a deadline for
filing for a minor party and its candidate seven months prior to the election is required to
advance legitimate state interests.” Id.
60 155 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1998).
61 Id. at 1333–34.
62 Id. at 1337 (citing Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718–19 (1974); Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134 (1972), see also Little v. Florida Dept. of State, 19 F.3d 4, 5 (11th Cir.1994)
(noting the constitutionality of the filing fees as long as there was an alternative method).
63 Id. at 1337-38. The magistrate judge in the district court noted that Green could
have achieved the necessity signatures if he had asked five volunteers to collect ten
signatures each day within the ninety-six days that Green was authorized to collect the
requisite signatures. Id. at 1338.
55
56
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Thus, the confusion regarding the applicability of the Anderson test
seemed to arise from the Supreme Court’s upholding Georgia’s 5%
signature requirement in Jenness. This generated the ambiguity as to
whether Anderson should be used to evaluate a Georgia ballot-access
statute or whether the constitutionality of all Georgia ballot-access
statutes was decided under Jenness, and any future nonpresidential
challenges are precluded.
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
A. Judge Anderson’s Majority Opinion
In Cowen v. Georgia Sec’y of State, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
erred by not applying the Anderson test to determine the
constitutionality of Georgia’s 5% signature requirement for political
bodies to place their candidates on the ballot.64 Thus, the court finally
clarified the lingering ambiguity regarding the appropriate approach for
deciding Georgia’s associational rights violation challenges under ballot
access statutes.65 In this case, the Georgia Secretary of State argued
that Jenness precluded Cowen’s challenge to Georgia’s 5% signature
requirement. The court rejected this argument and provided three
different rationales that justified the application of the Anderson test
for challenges by candidates seeking congressional offices.66
First, the court noted that the text of Anderson did not restrict its
application exclusively to presidential elections, which received a
heightened level of scrutiny for a state to overcome in justifying their
interests in those restrictions.67 Additionally, it concluded that limiting
the application of the Anderson test exclusively to presidential
candidates would be irrational and would undermine the
constitutionality of a minor political organization’s association rights.68
It would be irrational because exclusively applying to presidential

960 F.3d at 1340.
Id.
66 Id. at 1343–44.
67 Id. at 1344.
68 Id. However, the court notes the emphasis regarding presidential elections in that
“Anderson makes it clear that its requirements apply in all elections—but with a thumb
on the scale in favor of ballot access when the candidates challenging the requirements
are presidential candidates.”) Id.
64
65
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elections would permit the state to discriminate against political bodies
for non-presidential offices.69
Second, the court had already extended the Anderson test to cases
involving candidates seeking offices other than the presidency.70 These
extensions included minor political organization or independent
candidates seeking state senate, state house, sheriff, congressional, and
county commission candidates.71 To clarify any lingering ambiguity, the
court emphasized that the Anderson test applied in ballot-access
challenges by all candidates seeking any elected position.72
Third, the court held that Jenness did not preclude third-parties from
challenging the constitutionality of Georgia’s ballot-access restrictions
because the Anderson test was developed twelve years after Jenness
and supersedes its precedential authority.73 Furthermore, the court
noted that Bergland expressly held that Jenness did not preclude a
minor political organization from challenging Georgia’s signature
requirements and used the Anderson test to evaluate the
constitutionality of the State’s ballot-access restriction.74 The court
emphasized the district court’s misapplication of Coffield and
Cartwright, and concluded that these decisions did not foreclose future
challenges.75
B. Judge Jordan’s Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Judge Jordan agreed with Judge Anderson’s
analysis in the application of the Anderson test in all ballot-access
constitutionality claims, but sympathized with the district court’s

69 Id. (“[B]y its own text, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Anderson does not restrict its
holding to presidential candidates . . .we do not read that as an implied limitation on
Anderson’s applicability. Such a limitation would make little sense in context”).
70 Id.
71 Id. (citing Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 1316, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2011) (school
board candidates); Swanson v. Worley, 490 F.3d 894, 896, 902-03 (11th Cir. 2007) (state
senate, state house, and sheriff candidates); Green, 155 F.3d at 1333, 1335-36 (11th Cir.
1998) (congressional candidates); New Alliance Party, 933 F.2d at 1570, 1574 (11th Cir.
1991) (congressional candidate and county commission candidates); Bergland, 767 F.2d at
1552–53, 1553 n.1 (presidential candidates and a congressional candidate); Libertarian
Party of Fla. v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 792-93 (11th Cir. 1983) (state legislative, statewide
office, and presidential candidates).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1344–45.
74 Id. at 1345.
75 Id.
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rationale that Jenness was the controlling authority.76 Judge Jordan
provided additional reasoning that was omitted from the majority’s
opinion, in that once the Supreme Court had overturned a previous
standard, the lower courts must apply the newer standard to resolve
future cases.77 Although Judge Jordan acknowledged that Anderson is
controlling, he concluded that Jenness is not obsolete without providing
any explanation regarding how it continues to be relevant.78
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Overcoming Jenness
The court in Cowen resolved the ambiguity regarding the controlling
authority in determining challenges to ballot-access restrictions in
Georgia.79 However, the court emphasized that Anderson did not
overrule Jenness, and that a challenging party is still required to
distinguish itself from Jenness.80 Further, a minor political organization
will have to demonstrate how its First Amendment rights are overly
burdened when weighed against Georgia’s interest in maintaining the
five percent signature requirement. Thus, a third-party candidate’s
ability to overcome Jenness will have to adequately provide substantial
evidence proving the excessive burden that Georgia’s five percent
signature restriction imposes upon political bodies.81
If a political body wants to climb the mountain and reach its peak by
getting on Georgia’s ballots, it is imperative it proves why it cannot
overcome the obstacles set forth by Georgia’s electoral restrictions. In a
large majority of the prior Eleventh Circuit cases, the challenging party
lost its ballot-access restriction claim because it failed to adequately
demonstrate that a state’s ballot-access restrictions imposed a great
enough burden on a minor political organization. In most of these cases,
the minor party conceded that it failed to collect anywhere close to the
requisite signature amount.82
Cowen, 960 F.3d at 1347 (Jordan. J., concurring).
Id. at 1348.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1344–45.
80 Id. at 1346 (A political body “will have to demonstrate why a different result from
Jenness is required in this case—either because of different facts in the instant record, as
compared to the record in Jenness; changes in the relevant Georgia legal framework; or
the evolution of the relevant federal law”) Id.
81 Id.
82 See Bergland, 767 F.2d at 1555 (indicating that “the Libertarian Party had only
collected 8,488 signatures, the Independent Party collected 258 signatures, Williams
76
77
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It is highly unlikely that any minor political organization in Georgia
will overcome Jenness unless it can demonstrate the substantial
difficulty of complying with Georgia’s 5% signature requirement. It is
necessary for a political body to demonstrate a good-faith effort in
obtaining a number of signatures that is relatively close to the statutory
requisite. This effort will allow a third-party to demonstrate two crucial
points. First, it will highlight the impossibility of a third-party
candidate ever getting onto Georgia’s ballot when the requisite
percentage number is 5%.83 Second, it will also demonstrate that a
substantial proportion of Georgia citizens’ have an interest in voting for
a third-party candidate.

collected 15 signatures, Robinson collected 1,723 signatures for Lowery, and the Citizens
Party and Garland did not file any petition at all”); Swanson, 490 F.3d at 897 (indicating
that the Independent candidate only collected 11,000 out of the required 39,536
signatures); Green, 155 F.3d at 1338 (indicating that “[t]he magistrate judge aptly noted
that Green could comply by asking five volunteers each to collect ten signatures a day.
Moreover, Green admitted that he never tried to collect signatures”); Libertarian Party,
710 F.2d at 794 (indicating that Libertarian Party never attempted to collect the requisite
number of signatures because they believed Florida’s 3% requirement was impossible to
achieve); Coffield, 599 F.3d at 1276 (indicating that the third-party candidate only
collected 2,000 out of the 13,000-signature requirement).
83 It should be noted that in 2020, Georgia was required by court order to temporarily
lower their requisite signature requirement by thirty percent due to the Pandemic caused
by COVID-19. Cooper v. Raffensperger, No. 1:20-CV-01312, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
122237 at *21, 24 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2020). Additionally, Georgia’s Secretary of State did
not oppose the reduction in the amount of signature requirements. Id. at 23 n.9. Due to
this decision, candidates seeking access to Georgia’s ballots were only required to collect
36,180 signatures, instead of the normal requisite, 51,686 signatures. See Number of
Signatures Required for Nomination Petitions November 2020 General Election ONLY,
SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
GEORGIA’S
https://sos.ga.gov/admin/files/Number%20of%20Signatures%20Required%20for%20Nove
mber%202020%20Nomination%20Petitions.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,2020). This reduction
was a result of Governor Kemp’s declaration of public health state of emergency in
response to COVID-19 that mandated social distancing, recommended masks, and at one
point included a shelter-in-place order. Cooper, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *14-15. These
restrictions substantially impeded third-parties’ ability in safely and pragmatically gather
signatures. Id. Despite this difficulty, Shane Hazel, a candidate of the Libertarian Party
successfully petitioned himself onto Georgia’s election ballot in Georgia’s Senate Race
between Republican David Perdue and Democrat Jon Ossoff for the first time Georgia’s
history. Jessica Szilagyi, 2020 CANDIDATE INSIDER: Shane Hazel, Candidate for
U.S. Senate, ALLONGEORGIA (Oct. 1, 2020) https://allongeorgia.com/georgia-statepolitics/2020-candidate-insider-shane-hazel-candidate-for-u-s-senate/.
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B. Georgia’s Election laws in comparison with other States
By its electoral ballot-access restrictions, the Georgia legislature has
deterred competition and insured that political power will be restricted
to two political parties. In today’s contentious political climate, people
have turned to a third choice rather than selecting a candidate
nominated by the two-party system.84 However, the Georgia
legislature’s unwillingness to loosen ballot-access restrictions has been
attributed to the fear of increasing competition by potentially dividing
the vote among more candidates and making it more difficult to be reelected, or insuring the election of a candidate from a particular party.85
The Georgia General Assembly has declined to lower the threshold for
access by political bodies by rejecting any loosening of ballot-access
restrictions.86
84 Christian Collet, Trends: Third Parties and the Two-Party System, 60 Public
Opinion Quarterly 431, 436 (1996) (examining the public’s desire in having more choices
at the polls); Howard J. Gold, Americans Attitudes Toward the Political Parties and the
Party System, Government: Faculty Publications Smith College, Northampton, MA 1,4, 9,
10, 12-13 (2015) (examining that almost two decades of research (1996–2014))
have indicated the discontent of a substantial portion of the population regarding the two
major political parties as too ideological and an inadequate representation of the
populace, as well as an increase in the receptivity of electing a third party for presidential
and congressional positions.); Grace Sparks, Almost 40% of Americans want a third
political
party,
even
if
they
don't
like
the
candidates, CNN POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/04/politics/two-party-systempoll/index.html. (last updated Mar. 4, 2019).(examining that in 2019, forty percent of
Americans believe it is necessary for an independent third-party to fix the political
system).
85 Reed Galen, How Republicans and Democrats prevent independent candidates from
getting
on
the
ballot,
NBC
THINK
(Apr.
17,
2018,
4:37
AM)
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/how-republicans-democrats-prevent-independentcandidates-getting-ballot-ncna866466.(examining how State legislators have enacted
stringent ballot-access restrictions to ensure the duopoly of offering voters only two
options).
86 On February 8, 2019, Dar’Shun Kendrick, a member of Georgia’s House of
Representatives introduced House Bill 191 along with bi-partisan support of five other
members of Georgia’s House of Representatives. 2019–2020 Regular Session - HB 191,
Georgia
General
Assembly,
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/enUS/display/20192020/HB/191 (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). The Bill was then read a second
time on the next legislative day as procedurally required by Georgia’s House on February
11, 2019. The bill was sent to the Governmental Affairs Committee where the bill died. Id.
If passed, this bill would have lowered the signature requirement from five percent to one
percent “of the total number of electors who voted in the last election for the filling of the
office the candidate is seeking or 200 signatures, whichever is less, and the signers of
such petition shall be registered and eligible to vote in the election at which such
candidate seeks to be elected.” H.B. 191, 2019–2020 Regular Session, LC 28 8975, 1, 19
(Ga. 2019).
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Georgia’s rigorous 5% petition requirement applicable for political
bodies running for either the United States Senate or the House of
Representatives is one of the highest in the nation.87 Significantly,
political bodies running for a State legislative post, a local position, or
the office of the United States President have a substantially lesser
barrier to overcome, as they only need to meet the one percent
signature requirement.88 However, Georgia’s harsh signature
requirement is only applicable for political bodies running for a federal
position (excluding the office for the president of the United States).
Georgia’s rigorous ballot-access restrictions for federal and nonstatewide offices are also uniquely restrictive in comparison to its
neighboring states. Alabama only requires a political body to meet a 3%
signature requirement as measured by the total number of persons who
voted in the previous gubernatorial election.89 In Tennessee, a political
body must only meet a 2.5% signature requirement measured by the
total number of votes in the previous gubernatorial election.90 Most
notably, North Carolina merely requires a political body obtain a low
threshold of 0.25% to gain ballot-access.91 Afterwards, that political
body could maintain ballot-access in North Carolina by receiving 2%
percent of the votes in that election.92
Although South Carolina’s ballot-access restrictions seems similar to
Georgia’s in imposing a 5% signature requirement, South Carolina
implements a cap of 10,000 signatures based on the geographical area
where a political body is seeking office.93 Georgia’s ballot-access
restriction is substantially more restrictive than Florida’s ballot-access
requirement, in that a political body has a signature requirement of 1%
of the total registered voters in the geographical area to gain access to
Florida’s ballot.94 Since Georgia’s 5% signature requirement is the most
stringent in the Southeastern United States, it is likely only a matter of
time before its ballot-access restrictions are deemed unconstitutional.

See Mitchell, supra note 4.
O.C.G.A. § 2-2-170(b).
89 Code of Ala. § 17-6-22.
90 Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-1-104(a)(23).
91 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-96(a)(2).
92 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-96(a)(1).
93 S.C. Code Ann. § 7-11-70.
94 Fla. Stat. § 99.096; see also Fla. Stat. § 99.095; see also Fla. Stat. § 99.061
87
88
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C. Cowen as a steppingstone to electoral reform in Georgia?
The decision in Cowen brings a significant change to the ability of a
political body to challenge the constitutionality of Georgia’s ballotaccess restrictions as a violation of a third parties associational rights
under the First Amendment. This change in the application of the
Anderson test for political bodies could serve as a steppingstone in
overturning Georgia’s rigorous 5% requirement. The question arises,
however, as to whether loosening Georgia’s ballot-access restrictions
would result in more runoff elections.
More candidates on the ballot could lead to no candidates receiving a
majority, thus requiring a runoff between the top two candidates. In
Georgia’s electoral system, a candidate must win a majority of the votes
(essentially 50% plus one) for a candidate to win, but if a candidate is
unable to win that majority, then a runoff ensues between the top two
candidates.95 Georgia, is one of ten states96 that impose a candidate to
receive a majority of votes, with most of those states located in the
southern region of the United States and having a long history of oneparty rule.97
In this electoral system, Georgia is responsible for financing both the
primary election as well as the ensuing runoff election and loosening
the ballot-access requirements could ultimately be financially
burdensome.98 Additionally, voter participation generally plummets in
runoff elections, sometimes showing a twenty to thirty percent
decline.99 However, a third-party’s associational rights should not suffer
in a state that knowingly chose to implement a majority vote election
system where there was a substantial likelihood that a runoff would
ensue due to their electoral system.100 Thus, the financial burdens of

95 Wendy Underhill & Katharina Hubler, Primary Runoff Elections, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Aug.
2017),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-runoff-elections.aspx.
96 The other states requiring a majority vote win: Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Vermont. NCSL,
Primary Runoffs, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 8, 2017)
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-runoffs.aspx.
97 Hubler, supra note 95.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 The most common electoral scheme in America is a plurality voting system. In a
plurality voting system, the candidate who receives the most votes in a general election
are declared the winner. It is unnecessary for a candidate to receive over fifty percent of
the votes like in a majority vote electoral system. For example, in Maine, in the last
previous nine out of eleven elections, the elected governor received less than fifty percent
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having runoff elections and voters’ disinclination in participating in
runoff elections are not a sufficient justification to support Georgia’s
restrictive ballot-access requirements.
If political bodies are finally able to persuade a court to lower the
restrictions, would the Georgia legislature adopt legislation with the
intention to keep political bodies off the ballots by trying to circumvent
a court’s opinion in order to reduce the competition and prevent
additional runoff elections?101 After all, there are people who attribute
the loss of a major party candidates to interference from a third-party
candidate on a ballot and spoiling the election.102 However, this
perception is not a sufficient merit in limiting the rights guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments in order to preserve a
duopolistic system.103
In conclusion, Cowen resolving the ambiguity in the Eleventh Circuit
jurisprudence is a victory worth celebrating by political bodies in
of the vote. In order to circumvent the expensive cost of financing runoff elections,
Georgia could easily adopt a plurality voting scheme without infringing upon the political
bodies’ associational rights. Id.
101 It should be noted that out of the ten states that impose a majority vote electoral
system, both Alabama and North Carolina require a substantially lesser percentage of
petition signatures, (3% percent for Alabama, and 0.25% for North Carolina) and have not
deviated from their majority vote electoral system. See Code of Ala. § 17-6-22.; see also
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-96.
102 See Morgan Philips, Spoiler alert? Difference between Trump, Biden in key swing
states
is
Libertarian
votes,
Fox
News
(Nov.
10,
2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/libertarian-jo-jorgensen-difference-for-joe-biden-keyswing-states (referencing to the 2020 election in that Libertarian candidate Jo Jorgenson
“could have swung the Electoral College by at least 22 votes by supporting Trump in
battleground states Wisconsin, Michigan and Nevada. By throwing away their votes,
they’ve likely become spoilers for the Trump reelection effort”); see also Brian Doherty,
Libertarian Shane Hazel Is Proud To Be a Spoiler in Georgia Senate Race, REASON (Nov.
10, 2020 10:40 AM), https://reason.com/2020/11/10/libertarian-shane-hazel-is-proud-to-bea-spoiler-in-georgia-senate-race/(referencing the 2020 Libertarian senator candidate
“spoiling” the election and causing a runoff between Jon Ossoff and David Purdue); see
also Alex Thompson & Holly Otterbein, Jill Stein cost Hillary dearly in 2016. Democrats
are
still
writing
off
her
successor.
POLITICO (June 20, 2020 7:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/20/democrats-shrug-off-potential-green-partyspoiler-in-2020-329170 (referencing the 2016 election in that Green Party candidate, Jill
Stein cost the election for Democrat nominee Hillary Clinton the presidency, noting that
“had voters in Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin cast their ballots for Clinton rather
than the Green Party’s Stein, Clinton would be president.”).
103 See Williams, 393 U.S. at 32 (noting that a “State does have an interest in
attempting to see that the election winner be the choice of a majority of its voters. But to
grant the State power to keep all political parties off the ballot until they have enough
members to win would stifle the growth of all new parties.” Such severe restrictions were
not justifiable and infringed on both voting and associational rights)

956

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

Georgia. Although courts in Georgia are now required to use the
Anderson test in evaluating political bodies’ associational rights
violation claims, political bodies have a long way to go before they reach
the peak of Georgia’s mountain of ballot-access restriction. But for now,
at least some of the obstacles impeding the path have been cleared.

Sean Callihan

